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A B S T R A C T
Ghana’s 2008 election has been hailed by national and international observers as
a model for Africa. The perception of success has prevailed despite persistent
concerns about an inﬂated voters’ register and electoral fraud perpetrated by the
two major parties, the NPP and NDC, in their strongholds in the Ashanti and
Volta Regions respectively. Electoral malpractice in Ghana’s virtual two-party
system could acquire a decisive importance as a ‘ third force ’, representing an
even more important factor than the smaller opposition parties. Unfortunate
diplomatic and technocratic biases in election monitoring, combined with a re-
luctance on the part of the responsible authorities to investigate what appears to
be a long history of fraudulent voting, amounts to a dangerous time bomb of
unresolved conﬂict which could detonate in future elections.
* Thanks for valuable comments go to Sebastian Elischer, Isabel Pfaﬀ and Dario Wachholz at
GIGA, Steve Tonah at the University of Ghana, the anonymous reviewers and the editor of JMAS.
The responsibility for any fallacies or inaccuracies in the paper remains of course with the authors.
The latter participated in the 2008 elections as international election observers with the EU Election
Observation Mission and the Carter Center respectively. The views are those of the authors alone.
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G H A N A’ S 2008 E L E C T I O N – A S H O W C A S E F O R A F R I C A?
Successive democratic elections in Ghana in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008
resulted in two peaceful transfers of power between the major political
parties (in 2000 and 2008), as well as in continuing improvements in the
performance of Ghana’s formal institutions, notably the Electoral
Commission (EC), the judiciary and security forces. There was also a de-
monstrable increase in the oversight function of civil society organisations
and the media. The outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions of December 2008 was hailed by stakeholders, the national and
international media, diplomatic missions and international scholars alike
as another step forward in consolidating multiparty democracy in Ghana,
and as a model for the whole of Africa (Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Loetzer &
Mo¨nikes 2009: 95; Whitﬁeld 2009). Yet persistently inﬂated voters’ regis-
ters and block voting remained a concern, at least with respect to the
strongholds of the two major contesting parties.1 Some observers of the
2008 election have deplored the ‘growing ethnicisation’ of Ghanaian
politics, considered to be a heavy burden on the country’s on-going de-
mocratisation process. This is in spite of a long-standing tradition within
Ghanaian political culture of frowning on ethnic appeals, and various
provisions within the constitution and the electoral law (Political Parties Act
of 2000) designed to prevent ‘ tribalism’ (Loetzer & Mo¨nikes 2009: 77–8).2
There exists a long-standing controversy about block voting, and how
important swing voting has been in Ghana’s Fourth Republic (1992–2009).
The size of the core voting population in Ghana had been considerable, at
least in the 1996 and 2000 elections (about 82% of the voting population;
see Lindberg & Morrison 2005: 565). Nevertheless, swing voters brought
about the ﬁrst democratic alternation of power in 2000, thus challenging
assumptions that voting volatility in transitional regimes is higher than in
relatively consolidated African democracies like that of Ghana. There are
no robust data available to test whether the percentage of swing voters has
changed since the early 2000s. Ghanaian core and swing voters cannot be
distinguished by structural factors, like level of education, the rural–urban
divide, income and occupation, possibly apart from ethnicity.3 In any case,
strong block voting in two regions persisted. Ashanti (NPP) and Volta
Regions (NDC) (Fridy 2007: 282, 286–9; Morrison & Hong 2006: 235,
239) have never voted against the political tradition associated with their
region – the Busia-Danquah tradition in Ashanti, and the Nkrumahist
tradition in Volta – following the demise of the Ewe uniﬁcation movement
in the 1950s. This pattern has been repeated since the ﬁrst fully democratic
election in 1996, a trend which was conﬁrmed once more in 2008.
Together both regions represented a signiﬁcant proportion (26.6%) of all
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registered voters (12,472,758) in Ghana in 2008. Ashanti has the second
largest proportion of voters at 18.5%, behind Greater Accra with 20.2%.
The Volta Region accounts for 8.1% (EC website ; see also Fig. 1).4
On-going concern is reﬂected in claims and counter-claims about elec-
toral fraud. Although the total number of votes involved was possibly quite
small in 2008, the closeness of the result meant that vote massing could
well have jeopardised the legitimacy of the entire process. The most recent
election proved again that Ghana is virtually a two-party system (see
Fig. 1), possibly because of the peculiarities of its British-style electoral
system (multiple single-member constituencies ; see Morrison & Hong
2006: 631–2), reinforced by competing Ghanaian political traditions based
on ideology and related socio-economic divisions between ‘Nkrumahists ’
and ‘Busia-Danquahists ’. Expectations that one of the smaller opposition
parties could break through as a third force were again disappointed
(EU EOM 2009; Loetzer & Mo¨nikes 2009).
The history of Ghana’s electoral processes shows that, at least in popular
perception, ethnicity matters more than any other socio-economic variable
(Fridy 2007: 281, 302; Tonah 2009). Fortunately, during this (and previous)
elections this did not result in large-scale election violence as in other
African states like Kenya, Zimbabwe or Nigeria. Many voters view the
two major parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New
Patriotic Party (NPP), as representing mainly Ewe and Ashanti interests
respectively (Loetzer & Mo¨nikes 2009: 64, 78). However, in reality, the
relationship between ethnic politics and partisanship is far more complex.
Factors other than ethnicity, notably socio-economic issues, dominate
actual voting patterns in Ghana (Fridy 2007; Lindberg & Morrison 2008;
Nugent 2001b).
Nevertheless, persistent block voting in the Ashanti and Volta Regions
is a reality. Its eﬀects are compounded by a level of electoral malpractice
designed to stack up additional votes in areas of strength. Vote rigging in
regional party strongholds could acquire a decisive importance, possibly
representing an even more important ‘ third force ’ than the smaller op-
position parties or the factor of invalid votes.5 The sheer number of votes
that can be mobilised by each group may serve as a useful indicator. The
diﬀerence between valid votes in the ﬁrst and second rounds in the Ashanti
Region amounted to 241,284 (2.7% of the national total and 12.6% of
regional valid votes in the second round respectively), and in the Volta
Region to 68,184 (0.8% of the national total, or 9.3% of regional valid
votes). Both parties attributed the increases to extraordinary mobilisation
eﬀorts in the election campaign before the ﬁnal round. However, there are
strong indicators that a signiﬁcant part of the increase is due to electoral
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malpractice, as will be shown in the following sections. By comparison, the
candidate of the largest of the small opposition parties, Paa Kwesi Nduom
of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), gained 113,494 votes in the ﬁrst
round of the 2008 presidential election. In the ﬁnal round a mere 40,586
votes tipped the scale in favour of Atta Mills.
F I G U R E 1
Ghana 2008, presidential run-oﬀ election.
Number of valid votes, share of each candidate, and turnout (%) by region.
Source : EC-Ghana, Accra.
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Against the background of growing conﬂicts due to a new nationalism (cf.
Kohnert 2009) informed by the politics of belonging in Africa in general,
and recent electoral violence in Kenya and Nigeria in particular, the praise
for thepeaceful 2008 election inGhana is understandable.However, despite
the impression of a generally free and fair election, serious malpractices and
electoral fraud seemingly occurred. Again the most contested results came
from Ashanti and the Volta Region. Not all allegations were investigated
suﬃciently.6 The international community inside and outside Africa was at
pains to have a positive example to hold up, a model for Ghana’s African
peers to emulate. Rare were slightly critical remarks like those of the EU
Electoral Observers, for example with respect to the implausibly high
turnout in ﬁve Ashanti constituencies, and the lack of transparency in the
transmission of aggregated ﬁgures (EU EOM 2009: 29). The EC, which
would have been responsible for in-depth investigations, shied away – for
unknown reasons – from opening this can of worms. Possibly it lacked both
time and resources for a thorough investigation, or thought it wiser not to
touch these questions because they would not aﬀect the overall results. The
fact that the EC has not honoured an earlier promise to release detailed
polling station results suggests a preference for sweeping embarrassing
anomalies under the carpet.7However, although comprehensible in view of
the tense political situation at that time, this neglect could seriously distort
the picture of what actually took place, and threaten Ghana’s political
stability and democratic consolidation in the medium and long run. This is
the more so because it was apparently not the ﬁrst time that the EC dis-
regarded probable election rigging in the Ashanti, Volta and Northern
Regions, where similar unusually high turnout ﬁgures of over 90% of
registered voters were recorded in the 2004 presidential election.8 Could it
be that oﬃcials and international observers of the Ghanaian 2008 election
alike were blinded by the quest for an African success story? Whatever the
truth of the matter, the outcome is fraught with perils for the future.
Because both the NDC and the NPP believe that the other side perpetrated
fraud in their strongholds and got away with it, it is highly likely that they
will try to do so on an even greater scale in 2012. This raises the prospects of
electoral violence and the delegitimation of the electoral process, unless the
matter is dealt with in an open and impartial manner.
D I P L O M A T I C A N D T E C H N O C R A T I C B I A S I N E L E C T I O N
O B S E R V A T I O N I N G H A N A’ S 2008 E L E C T I O N?
The peaceful and largely transparent outcome of the 2008 election was to
a large extent due to the strong commitment and active engagement of
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Ghana’s media and civil society, which monitored and commented on the
electoral process with great zeal. Think tanks, advocacy groups, religious
and professional organisations, and NGOs, comprised an impressive
platform of independent coverage of the polling process, assisted by ad-
vanced technology, meant for regular updates of local and regional results,
parallel vote tabulation via mobile phone text messages and local radio
stations (Gyimah-Boadi 2009: 145–6; Loetze & Mo¨nikes 2009: 80–2). The
contribution made by the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
(CODEO) was of singular importance. All the actors concerned were
mindful of what could go wrong, in light of the recent Kenyan experience.9
The overall evaluation by international election observers, whose presence
was similarly enhanced by the Kenyan crisis and early problems with the
voters’ register, reﬂected these positive inputs.10 But other considerations
were also at work. Overriding concerns about political stability in the sub-
region, and conﬂict prevention in view of the volatile political situation in
neighbouring Coˆte d’Ivoire and Togo, may have enhanced the tendency to
accentuate the positive. Thus, a certain diplomatic bias cannot be denied
for the Ghanaian case.11 An additional technocratic bias,12 notably a dis-
regard forGhanaian election history as well as informal politics, and a focus
exclusively and excessively on formal procedures of multiparty democracy,
apparently blinded impartial observers to the realities on the ground.
One case in question is the long-standing controversy about the inﬂated
voters’ register and its connection with the unusually high turnout ﬁgures
in the run-oﬀ election in numerous constituencies of the Ashanti, Volta
and Northern Regions in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections.13
Kuenzi and Lambright (2007: 684–5) have observed in general a positive
relationship between electoral experience and voter turnout in multiparty
elections in sub-Saharan Africa, but this is complicated by the fact that
turnout was also higher in Africa’s less democratic regimes, compared
with the democratic ones. In Ghana, similarly high turnout ﬁgures were
reported for the 1996 and 2004 presidential elections in the Ashanti and
Volta Regions (EC website). In the 2000 presidential election, the ﬁrst
democratic polls which brought an alternation of power (this time from
NDC to NPP), turnout was relatively low. Nevertheless, allegations about
electoral irregularities, a bloated voters’ register, and patterns of voter
turnout, notably in the Volta and Ashanti Regions, were already rife.14
Controversies over the integrity of the voters’ register have become a
regular feature in Ghana’s elections, and have led in some cases to political
crisis. For example, the 1992 election was marred by opposition allegations
(mostly unsubstantiated) about a ‘stolen verdict ’, followed by its boycott of
the December legislative polls. In the 2000 election the voters’ register had
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been grossly inﬂated, especially in the Greater Accra, Ashanti and Volta
Regions. The reasons given focused on double registration in diﬀerent
regions, fraudulent registration of minors and the deceased as major prob-
lems, resulting in an estimated 1.5 million ‘ghost voters ’ (Smith 2002:
624–31). Even during the 2008 election campaign, out of a total of
12,822,474 registered voters, 349,496 entries were removed by the EC
because they were considered as irregular (see also EU EOM 2009: 14–16).
The EC had expected to register an additional 800,000 voters since 2006,
the year of the last update of the register, which corresponded to estimates
of the number of citizens who had attained voting age. However, the 2008
provisional register listed nearly an additional 2 million voters (Ichino &
Schu¨ndeln 2009: 5). Again the highest increase in registered voters during
the limited registration exercise of the EC (from 31 July to 13 August 2008)
was to be observed in the Ashanti Region: 374,451 new voters were re-
corded, an increase of 330.7% over the 2006 exercise. The provisional voter
population for the region increased however by only 18.7% to 2,381,214
voters compared with the 2006 electoral roll.15 For the whole of Ghana the
total increase of the number of voters was 16.7% to 12,822,474.16 CODEO
(2009: 34) concluded in a statement issued on 4 August 2008 that violence
during voter registration and irregularities had been ‘widespread’. In view
of a persistently bloated register, notably in Ashanti and Volta Region, the
abnormally high turnout ﬁgures are even more diﬃcult to credit.
Although barely credible turnout ﬁgures were criticised in the ﬁnal re-
port of the EU Election Observation Mission (2009: 29), this critique was
not as exhaustive as it could have been. In fact, a total of nine con-
stituencies in Ashanti, two to four in Volta, and one each in the Central,
Eastern and Upper West Regions, showed questionable results, with
Ashanti by far the greatest suspected culprit (Tables 1, 2).17 A similar
pattern was to be observed in the 2004 presidential election when, for
example, at least ﬁve constituencies in Ashanti produced dubious turnout
rates, most of which were problematic in 2008. The same was true of
at least three constituencies in the Northern Region, including two re-
porting 95%, as well as three in the Volta Region.18 It is certainly not
by chance that these inconsistencies recurred mainly in those regions
where the inﬂuence of block voting remains most entrenched. Registration
fraud and concomitant inﬂated turnout ﬁgures are probably more likely
in party strongholds than in competitive areas (Ichino & Schu¨ndeln 2009:
10, 16).
It is open to question whether the questionable results were cross-
checked by the EC or other responsible authorities, and what actions have
since been taken to remedy the situation. It is conceivable – but not very
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TA B L E 1
Ghana presidential election 2008: Ashanti region, results of doubtful validity (a) : 1st round (7.12.08) & run-oﬀ (28.12.08) (c)
Ashanti
1st round 2nd round
Turnout %
Constituency NPP NDC Valid votes Turnout % Reg. voters NPP NDC Valid votes Turnout % 2ndx1st round
Aﬁgya/Sekyere East 33,855 9,240 43,623 77.29 57,040 40,788 9,641 50,429 89.15 +12
Bantama (b) 40,493 7,649 48,690 70.90 69,215 56,227 8,532 63,759 93.81 +23
Atwima-Kwanwoma 33,324 6,013 39,766 77.69 51,995 39,147 6,564 45,711 88.42 +11
Kwabre East 43,329 10,473 54,288 75.06 73,222 50,502 11,796 62,298 85.68 +11
Kwadaso (b) 44,341 8,069 52,950 70.65 75,488 62,110 8,876 70,986 94.47 +24
Manhyia (b) 66,116 18,835 85,896 71.47 121,082 95,281 20,210 115,491 95.71 +24
Nyiaeso S.M. (b) 37,043 10.464 48,243 71.98 67,540 54,545 11,681 66,266 98.29 +26
Old Tafo 34,887 12,243 47,543 72.05 66,676 47,476 13,416 60,892 91.62 +20
Suame (b) 47,768 9,344 57,687 69.70 82,758 67,790 10,368 78,158 94.73 +24
Total 1,214,350 438,234 1,677,285 73.58 2,317,686 1,438,820 479,749 1,918,569 83.31 9.73
Notes (a) constituencies with results of ‘doubtful validity ’ are those with turnout over 95%, or over 90% and overwhelmingly for one candidate, or an increase in
turnout of over 10% between 1st and 2nd round. Second round turnout of over 90%, and diﬀerences between ﬁrst and second round turnout over 10%, are in bold.
(b) these constituencies’ results are questioned also by EU EOM 2008.
(c) for the 1st round the Table gives preliminary results.
Source : Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC); compilation by the authors.
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likely – that the unusually high turnout ﬁgures truly reﬂect the strong
engagement of voters in the constituencies concerned. The worst-case
scenario is that a perception of impunity, inﬂuenced by ethnicity in al-
ready volatile constituencies and in certain regions, will encourage en-
hanced electoral fraud in future elections. Those who commented
favourably on the elections pointed out that the Election Commissioner,
Dr Afari-Gyan, scored a tremendous achievement in producing a legit-
imate result. At the height of the disputed run-oﬀ, his strategy appears to
have been to call the bluﬀ of the NPP by accepting disputed results from
Ashanti and then pointing out that these were not enough to overturn the
majority that had been chalked up by Mills. When the NPP insisted that
the Tain constituency, where there had been no voting, could still aﬀect
the outcome, he called their bluﬀ again and agreed not to declare the
result until the election had been rerun there. No doubt, this was evidence
of deft footwork, but the point remains that the ﬁnal result was arrived by
glossing over allegations of signiﬁcant electoral fraud. The precedent that
has been set is a dangerous one, and there is no guarantee that a future
Commissioner will be as ﬂeet of foot in future.
In the next two sections, we examine the elections in Ashanti and the
Volta Region in closer detail. These were the regions where the most
serious allegations were made, but it is important also to consider the
atmosphere in which the polls were conducted. A successful election does
not merely hinge on an accurate tally of how voters cast their ballots : it also
has to be seen to be fair. Election crises tend to occur when a psychology of
T A B L E 2
Ghana presidential election 2008: Volta region, results of doubtful
validity (a) 1st round (7.12.08) & run-oﬀ (28.12.08) (c)
Volta
1st round 2nd round
turnout %
Constituency
(b) NPP NDC
valid
votes
turnout
%
reg.
voters NPP NDC
valid
votes
turnout
%
2ndx1st
round
Ho East (b) 1,373 21,168 23,235 67.44 35,233 1,836 26,605 28,441 81.50 +14
Anlo (b) 863 31,153 32,462 70.63 46,653 1,328 36,207 37,535 80.88 +10
Keta (b) 1,000 28,846 30,188 72.26 42,303 1,057 33,693 34,750 82.63 +10
Ketu South (b) 2,815 56,484 60,238 62.52 98,283 3,415 68,595 72,010 73.88 +11
Total : 99,538 551,046 664,888 67.12 1,012,122 102,173 630,899 733,072 73.11
Notes (a) constituencies with results of ‘doubtful validity’ are those with turnout over 95%, or over 90% and
overwhelmingly for one candidate, or an increase in turnout of over 10% between 1st and 2nd round. Diﬀerences
between 1st and 2nd round turnout over 10%, are in bold.
(b) these constituencies’ results are questioned also by EU EOM 2008.
(c) for the 1st round the Table gives preliminary results.
Source : Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) ; compilation by the authors.
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mistrust becomes deeply rooted. In these two regions, there was abundant
evidence for this mistrust in 2008, which does not bode particularly well
for the future.
T H E C A S E O F A S H A N T I R E G I O N
There was never any doubt that the chances of the NPP being re-elected
in 2008 hinged on retaining the absolute loyalty of the Ashanti Region as a
vote bank, as party oﬃcials readily admitted. One consideration was
whether the NPP could retain the sympathy of voters in parts of the region
that were more recent converts to the party cause. In Ashanti, there have
historically been two weak links. One is at the geographical margins, re-
ﬂecting deeper historical dynamics of ‘Greater Asante’. In the 1996
presidential poll, the NDC won a majority in three constituencies in
northern Ashanti and two in the south. In the ﬁrst round of the 2000
presidential election, only Ejura Sekyedumase and New Edubiase resisted
the NPP. In the second round, John Kufuor only failed to carry the latter
constituency for the NPP. If support for the government were to erode,
however, an adverse swing was always possible in these marginal con-
stituencies. Secondly, Ashanti has witnessed considerable levels of immi-
gration, from the Volta Region but more particularly from the north. The
Zongo communities have tended to vote NDC. Hence the Asawase par-
liamentary seat in Kumasi was captured by the NDC in 2004, despite its
poor showing elsewhere.
A real concern for the NPP campaign team was that Ashanti voters
might not turn out to vote for an Akyem presidential candidate, even if
they remained broadly disposed to the NPP as a party. Hence turnout was
always regarded as a prime consideration. Nana Akufo-Addo brought
prominent Ashantis into his campaign in order to reassure voters that the
party remained ﬁrmly rooted in its tradition as an Ashanti/Akyem al-
liance. The team staged big rallies in Kumasi and larger urban centres, in
an attempt to persuade voters that it retained enthusiastic support in the
region. The fundamental question of how many Ashanti voters there ac-
tually were was dogged by controversy from the start. Before the reopen-
ing of the voters’ register, the NDC complained that the ﬁgures for
thirteen Ashanti constituencies were massively inﬂated. In April, the EC
set up an independent committee to investigate this claim. Dr Afari-Gyan
initially lent credence to NDC fears when he conﬁrmed that the increase
in the number of voters in Ashanti was not credible, but in June he revised
his assessment. He announced that the incorrect ﬁgures, which were the
result of a printing error, only existed in hard copies of the register that had
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been sent to parties, and were not replicated in the EC’s own database.
Although this supposedly meant that there should be no further cause for
concern, the NDC believed that any error was deliberate, and would be
brought into play later on. The problem was compounded when the re-
gister was reopened to allow those who had attained full voting age to add
their names. The NDC alleged that there had been systematic attempts to
pump up the numbers in Ashanti, through a combination of double and
under-age registration. Therefore, the opposition parties remained ex-
tremely sceptical about the ﬁgures. During the campaign, Rawlings not
surprisingly returned to the claim that there was a plot to rig the election,
centred on Ashanti. The fact that some large question marks remained
over the process disposed many opposition supporters to believe the worst.
The election campaign in the region witnessed a few incidents of viol-
ence, but some of these involved rival candidates for NPP parliamentary
nominations, as was the case in Bekwai. On the whole, the campaign
passed oﬀ with little trouble. In the ﬁrst round of voting in 2004, Kufuor
had captured 1,235,395 out of 1,679,664 votes, which translated into 73.6%
of the votes in Ashanti. In the ﬁrst round in 2008, Akufo-Addo won
1,214,350 out of 1,677,285 votes, amounting to 72.4%. By contrast, Mills
had won 398,362 (23.7%) of the votes in 2004, whereas in 2008 this had
increased to 438,234 votes, or 26.1% (see Table 1). In other words, regional
turnout had dipped slightly, but this was to the disadvantage of Akufo-
Addo. Mills, on the other hand, had seen his total number and share of the
Ashanti vote increase. The NDC had also managed to take its number of
parliamentary seats back to three – New Edubiase, Ejura Sekyedumase
and Asawase – while two NPP rebel candidates had won as independents.
All of this was understandably a matter of considerable alarm to the
NPP campaign team. Akufo-Addo supporters privately complained that
the relatively low turnout in Ashanti had cost Akufo-Addo a ﬁrst round
victory, which he only narrowly missed with 49.1% of the national vote.
There was also some dissatisfaction at the failure of Kufuor to play a more
active role on the campaign trail, which may have been rooted in his
historically strained relationship with elements of the Ashanti political elite
(Elischer 2008), and his earlier support for Alan Kyerematen as the party
candidate. In the run-up to the second round, Kyerematen, who had
brieﬂy resigned from the party, was brought in to head the campaign in
Ashanti in the belief that he held the key to a higher turnout – despite
being a Fante. A special appeal was made to Ashanti voters to prevent
Rawlings from staging a comeback on the coat tails of Mills. The Mills
campaign meanwhile hoped to make modest gains in Ashanti, while
consolidating the swing elsewhere.
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In the ﬁnal analysis, Akufo-Addo achieved what he was hoping for in
Ashanti during the second round. The total vote in Ashanti rose to
1,880,372, with Akufo-Addo taking 1,401,421 (74.5%) and Mills 478,749
(25.5%). Akufo-Addo had therefore conjured up another 187,071 votes and
increased his overall share, whereas Mills had increased his numbers by a
mere 40,515. If the balance of forces had remained the same in the other
regions, the additional votes (just over 1% of the national total) would have
pushed Akufo-Addo over the winning line. As it happened, the gains in
Ashanti were wiped out by the swing to Mills in all the other regions,
including Brong-Ahafo that had gone to the NPP in round one. The
question that arises is whether the NPP campaign team genuinely im-
proved its performance in the second round, or had resorted to illegitimate
tactics. It has to be said that the results in certain constituencies look
extremely suspicious. At Manhyia, where the recorded turnout was
95.7%, the NPP vote rose from 66,116 in the ﬁrst round to 95,281 in the
second (+24%). At Nhyiaeso, where the alleged turnout was 98.3%, it
rocketed from 37,043 to 54,545 (+26%); and in Suame it climbed from
47,768 to 67,790 on a 95% turnout (+24%; see Table 1). The total turnout
ﬁgures for Ashanti (83.3%) were out of line with the ﬁgures for the rest of
the country (72.7%). Interestingly, the turnout in Akufo-Addo’s own re-
gion, Eastern Region, stood at only 72.2%. Given the closeness of the
contest, these increases could well have been enough to determine the
overall result.
Perhaps voters in Ashanti genuinely feared a return of the NDC more
than other Ghanaians. Yet recorded increases in electoral participation,
leading to very questionable turnout ﬁgures at the constituency level,
should have caused concern among international observers. It is unlikely
that massive fraud occurred at the level of individual polling stations, given
the strong presence of CODEO and international electoral observers.
However, there may have been manipulation and intimidation in those
polling stations or constituencies where NDC polling agents withdrew on
polling day. The transmission of results from the constituency level to the
Electoral Commission headquarters provides much broader scope for
electoral rigging. This is conﬁrmed by evidence in other countries, where
elections have taken a violent turn in the post-poll period. The claim that
two diﬀerent sets of results were received in the EC ‘strong room’, with
the second revealing much higher ﬁgures than the ﬁrst, has never been
properly explained. What is even more suspicious is that the regional oﬃce
of the EC appears to have deliberately held back from declaring a number
of Ashanti results.19 By releasing the NPP’s bombs at the end, the NDC
claimed, it was possible to claim victory at the last gasp: that is, once it was
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known how many votes were still required to concoct a victory. There is
some plausibility to this reading of what happened, because a relatively
comfortable Mills majority suddenly evaporated as the last results came in.
It was not enough as it happened, but the NPP came close to snatching
victory at the last gasp. Interestingly, the constituencies that declared late
included those where there was an implausible turnout : notably Nhyiaeso
(98.3%), Kwadaso (94.5%), Manhyia (95.7%) and Suame (94.7%).
The NDC complained bitterly about these ﬁgures, and for some hours
the entire election teetered on the brink of crisis. But after the Tain result
was declared, Afari-Gyan announced on 3 January 2009 that the EC had
investigated and concluded that the NDC had failed to produce suﬃcient
evidence in the shape of complete polling station returns for the disputed
constituencies. In reality, this was a mammoth task, especially when some
polling agents had not been present at the ﬁnal count. Although the NDC
was still deeply unhappy, it had been declared the overall winner and
decided to live with the Ashanti anomalies rather than provoke a crisis.
Nana Akufo-Addo, on the other hand, was urged by Kufuor to accept
defeat with good grace rather than resorting to the courts or direct action
on the streets. The NPP’s own complaints about the Volta Region were
similarly dismissed. Since then, the EC has shown no inclination to revisit
the issue of electoral malfeasance. It has oﬀered no explanation of the
turnout ﬁgures, no reason for the late declaration of certain Ashanti re-
sults, and has failed to mount a complete set of results on its website that
would enable Ghanaians to judge for themselves. These are serious
shortcomings that might come back to haunt the country in the future.
T H E C A S E O F V O L T A R E G I O N
20
Before going into detail, it bears repeating that irregularities in the form of
abnormally high registration rates in some constituencies, bloated voters’
registers, abnormal increases in voter turnout in the run-oﬀ election
(notably in southern constituencies dominated by the Anlo-Ewe), rigging
and ethnic block voting have a history in the Volta Region.21 This is a
history which has coloured NPP perceptions of the likelihood of being able
to contest on a level playing ﬁeld.
The hope of NPP activists in the Volta Region for a reversal of their
historic fortunes was based on a number of considerations. In the 2004
election, the party succeeded in winning a parliamentary seat in Nkwanta
North for the ﬁrst time.22 The NPP strategy was accordingly focused on
minority areas, where they aspired to win at least four constituencies :
Nkwanta North again, Nkwanta South, Krachi East and Krachi West, as
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well as Ketu North in the southern part of the region where the regional
minister was running. NPP oﬃcials boasted of their impartial record of
concern for the welfare of the whole region: for example, they pointed out
that their government had built a Polytechnic College in Ho which ought
to signiﬁcantly redress the perception of marginalisation. Their party
oﬃces were very well frequented and their public meetings well attended,
all of which gave the impression that they had managed to make inroads
in the region. Nevertheless, there was a common belief that public money
had been diverted by a corrupt national government to other regions that
were better endowed with basic infrastructure like roads, schools and
hospitals.
The NPP exploited the advantage of incumbency in the Volta Region.
For example, apart from the usual distribution of large numbers of
T-shirts, they provided school books in the villages, traditional presents to
the chiefs and queen mothers, and – at least according to usually reliable
local informants – also cash as an incentive to vote for the ‘right ’ candidate.
Some money was allegedly used to bring registration oﬃcers ‘on board’.23
The deal was said to involve the registration of anyone brought by the
party with no questions asked, including ‘minors ’, and to place potential
opposition voters on a ‘wrong’ list of voters. This was precisely what
happened in Hohoe during the registration process, where two employees
of the Regional Electoral Commission (REC) were arrested by police on
the grounds of manipulating voters’ lists.24 According to information re-
leased by the police, the accused confessed to having taken money from
NPP. However, no complaint about the registration process was brought
to the knowledge of the EU observers, though they especially asked for it
in the villages. Other fraudulent practices concerned ballot papers meant
for NDC strongholds that would be rendered useless by printing mistakes
and subsequently be rejected by NPP party agents. This happened in a few
places (e.g. in Nkwanta District), but its net eﬀect was only to delay the
voting process, and not to hinder it completely. In addition, the NPP
organised so called ‘party youth’ in a number of constituencies like Krachi
East, with the aim of harassing opposition and election oﬃcials. This
happened speciﬁcally in Dambai.
In the ﬁnal analysis, the REC was able to secure an acceptable election
process. Apart from Buem Constituency (Jasikan District), all constituency
result sheets were signed by representatives from both parties. In Jasikan,
NPP agents failed to turn up for the tabulation process. The Returning
Oﬃcer claimed that NPP party oﬃcials told them to stay away. The re-
sults in the Volta Region showed a NDC landslide, to no one’s great
surprise. Apart from Nkwanta North, all the other parliamentary
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constituencies went to the NDC. There were only minor incidents, as in
Krachi East, where the car taking the ballot boxes to the regional oﬃce
was attacked and the boxes stolen. Since the Presiding Oﬃcer carried the
signed result sheets, the REC was able to announce the results.
Not much was seen in the local arena regarding the upcoming run-oﬀ
between the presidential candidates, by contrast with the heated discus-
sions on TV, radio and in the newspapers about electoral rigging in the
Volta and Ashanti Regions. NPP oﬃcials claimed that the election in the
Volta Region had been marred by fraud, and stressed that their party
agents had been harassed and had not been allowed to take up their
duties. Some of these allegations were repeated by NPP oﬃcials at the
constituency level. What casts some doubt on the claims is that NPP agents
had signed all result sheets except one at the tabulation centres. It would
have been easy for the REC in Ho to clarify matters, but the EC answered
solely in general terms and did not refer to any concrete allegation. This
was left to the press, but because journalists’ movements were quite re-
stricted due to ﬁnancial constraints, many cases were not investigated. In
the end, the claims became part of the stock of NPP propaganda to dis-
credit the NDC in the run-oﬀ.
Two days before the second round, a group of about a hundred so-
called ‘Macho Boys’, that is NPP sympathisers, were brought in from
Accra. When asked about their role in the election, the mainly young men
claimed to be working as polling staﬀ. However, they had no idea about
election procedures. The EU observers met them close to Kpando town,
where they were lodging, and had a long discussion with a large number of
them. On voting day they were brought to polling stations, where they
often met local party agents who refused to be replaced by them. The
context was one in which the national party organisers believed that their
agents in the region were likely to be susceptible to pressure, whereas
outsiders would perform a better job. Not surprisingly, the accredited
agents from the region took exception. Only two agents per party were
allowed inside a polling station at any given time. Some of the ‘Macho
Boys’ ﬁrst came to their assigned polling station by late afternoon. Their
names on the party’s list of oﬃcially authorised party agents had often
been replaced or overwritten. This was why many Presiding Oﬃcers did
not allow them inside the polling station. Others, who had been allowed
inside, later refused to sign the result sheets. Evidence procured by REC as
well as a number of oral admissions to the EU observers suggested that
NPP party agents told them not to sign, though they could give no con-
crete reason for their refusal.25 The constituency result summary sheets
were not signed by NPP agents in three cases : Ho Central, North Dayi
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and Keta. In Anlo, these outsiders were chased away by townspeople in a
fraught atmosphere. There was a deep-rooted perception in the region
that the ‘Macho Boys’ had been brought in to interfere with the demo-
cratic process. The background was that a prominent chief, known for his
critical stand vis-a`-vis the government, had been killed a few weeks before,
and the government was blamed. The police explained that they escorted
the young men out of town because of security concerns, while the REC
claimed that this was not their responsibility. In short, the ‘Macho Boys ’
caused a lot of ill-feeling and were the source of many rumours in the
Volta Region, although in the end their presence did not have much eﬀect
since the procedures in place were working.26 Nevertheless, compared
with the ﬁrst round, when the NPP secured 9.2%, their share rose to
13.94% in the second round, while NDC came down from 88.64 to
86.06%. What is open to speculation is the much higher turnout in the
second round, namely 739,669 total votes as compared to 679,396 in the
ﬁrst round, amounting to an increase of 60,600 in the number of votes
cast. Some of the increase in speciﬁc constituencies would warrant closer
investigation by the REC or EC.27
Although Mills was of Fante origin, people in the Volta Region still
associated the party with former president Rawlings, the NDC’s grey
eminence who has a partly Ewe background. The reason given for why a
change of government was necessary was that the power had to be taken
away from ‘those people inKumasi ’ who allegedly did not care aboutVolta
Region – the fairly poor road conditions were often invoked as evidence.28
An indicator of NPP’s view of its prospects in the second round, as seen by
the party’s ‘National Campaign Coordination’, was the failure of national
party oﬃcials to put in a showing during the pre-election period. Clearly,
the region had been written oﬀ. It appears that the operative strategy was
to disturb the election procedures and – if the situation should permit – to
use this in order to hinder the oﬃcial announcement of the ﬁnal presi-
dential results, should these not be in favour of the NPP.
Three days before voting took place, the government closed the border
with Togo, on suspicion that a number of Ewe people from Togo had
registered and would vote in the interest of their kinsmen. The furious
reaction by NDC oﬃcials showed that this distrust was not completely
misplaced.29 Signiﬁcantly, no other border was closed. Every time the
NDC regional oﬃce was visited by the EU observers, the latter en-
countered allegations about the rigging of the election by NPP (and vice
versa). Sometimes, the claims were quite obscure. For example observers
were told that the houses of NDC sympathisers in Dambai had been
marked by NPP youth, as in Rwanda, in order to deal with them after the
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election. However, when EU oﬃcials tried to verify the allegations on the
spot, NDC oﬃcials were not able to provide any evidence. In Kete-Krachi
the observers were told that many Muslim youth members who were re-
garded as potential NDC voters had been imprisoned due to unrest in
the town. In reality however it proved to be an internal quarrel in the
Zongo Muslim Community between the Muslim youth and so-called
traditionalists.
In short, (perceived) ethnicity continued to be a major underlying factor
in the 2008 election in the Volta Region. This clearly played a part in the
block voting. But it also underlined contrasting images of political virtue:
whereas the Volta Region has been stereotyped within NPP circles as a
superstitious, almost barbarous place where it is practically impossible to
secure a fair deal, NDC activists in the region see themselves as the
strongest bulwark against Ashanti hegemonic pretensions. These dis-
courses need to be taken seriously because, as the Kenyan example shows,
an escalation of political tensions can lead to their operationalisation in as
yet unrealised ways. The traditional structures and their role in the elec-
tion have so far been left out of most analyses. As in other African societies,
traditional authorities play a greater role than is generally taken into
consideration by election observers.30 The question is whether and how
far other ethnic groups could become embroiled in ethnic cleavages
within the framework of future elections. Whether the NDC and NPP
will honour the Code of Conduct for political parties as well as the
formal legal precautions against instrumentalisation of ethnicity in
politics in the next election remains to be seen. But there are some
worrying signs.
: : :
Undoubtedly, Ghana’s process of democratisation is more advanced than
in many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Already in 2000, swing
voting was signiﬁcant enough to produce a change of government. In
addition, it has become more diﬃcult for individuals and political parties
to cheat massively in Ghana’s elections, despite persistent voting irregu-
larities and widespread abuse of incumbency. The EC has carved out a re-
putation as an independent, fair and credible institution. Signiﬁcantly, the
elite and large sections of the population were prepared to accept results
declared by the EC when it mattered. Nevertheless, neglected or un-
recognised electoral fraud and a history of impunity in already volatile
constituencies and regions of decisive importance for the general outcome
of the polls could encourage large-scale electoral fraud in future elections.
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This poses a threat and is a destabilising factor in Ghana’s democratisation
process.
The Achilles’ heel of election administration in Ghana has been the
dubious voters’ register and the irresolute attitude of the EC and other
responsible authorities when it came to checking improbably high voter
turnouts and apparent electoral malpractice connected with block voting
in several constituencies in Ashanti and the Volta Region. Surprisingly,
neither of the main political parties insisted on rigorous in-depth
investigation once their complaints were rebuﬀed by the EC. Could it
be that the instrumentalisation of ethnicity played a major part in
vote rigging, in view of the fact that ‘ethnic cleavages ’ constitute a deeply
engrained emic view of the rule of politics in Ghana, and that each of
the concerned hoped to proﬁt from it eventually at the expense of the
other?
Certainly, diverse constitutional and other legal provisions mentioned
above prevented straightforward ‘ethnic voting’. However, in a society
where informal institutions and ethnicity in politics and economy are
paramount (Fallon 2004; Lentz & Nugent 2000; Meagher 2007; Nugent
2001b; Tonah 2009), formal political rules operate under severe con-
straints. An in-depth study of the 2004 election revealed that in most cases
local inﬂuences dominated voters’ decisions, including primordial cleav-
ages, regional political traditions, and the inﬂuence of traditional chiefs
(Boafo-Arthur 2006: 365–6). A piecemeal but painstaking democratisation
of the fabric of informal politics including chieftaincy (which seems to be
deeply involved in block voting), and a meaningful decentralisation policy
from below (Crawford 2009), would be required to lay a sustainable base
for a functioning democracy at the grass-roots level, which could eventu-
ally lead to a more responsive government. A precondition for downward
accountability is to simultaneously empower local governments and citi-
zens. Past experience shows that ‘decentralisation from above’ cannot do
the job. It prevents a genuine devolution of power, which would require
among other things a realignment of the structures of traditional authority
in line with basic democratic requirements (Crawford 2008, 2009). In
short, there is nothing which could replace political struggle for real
democracy from below.
N O T E S
1. As expected, the contesting major parties and their candidates attained their best results with
highest voter turnout in their respective strongholds: Nana Akufo-Addo, leader of the National
Patriotic Party (NPP) gained 75% of valid votes in Ashanti, and Atta Mills, presidential candidate of
National Democratic Congress (NDC) got 86% in Volta Region, labelled as the ‘World Bank’ of the
NDC by party veteran and former head of state Jerry Rawlings (see Figure 1).
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2. According to Gyimah-Boadi (2009: 143), ‘both parties shamelessly attempted to mobilize ethnic
votes, virtually declaring their respective strongholds – the Ashanti Region for the NPP and the Volta
Region for the NDC – as ‘‘no-go’’ zones for their opponents’ during the run-oﬀ to the presidential
election on 28.12.2008.
3. Unfortunately, Lindberg & Morrison (2005: 577) could not test for ethnic bloc voting because of
lack of time and reliable data.
4. See EC-website: www.ec.gov.gh/node/63. As regards core and swing voters, the Central Region
(8.2% of registered voters) was a notable example, because in 2008 the Fante-Akan majority of the
population abandoned the NPP for the NDC, apparently for non-ethnic reasons. The Central Region
voted for the NDC in 1992, 1996 and 2008, but for the NPP in 2000 and 2004. There were ‘swings’
against the NPP in Brong-Ahafo, and in its favour in parts of the North.
5. The remarkable increase of the percentage of invalid votes in Ghanaian elections since 1992 led
some scholars already to believe that these rejected ballots could act as a possible ‘ third force’, an even
more decisive factor in tipping the scales than the smaller opposition parties (Gyimah-Boadi 2009:
150). Invalid votes amounted to 205,438 or 2.4% in the ﬁrst round of the 2008 election, and 92,886 or
1.0% in the second round. For reasons for the unusually high number of invalid votes in the ﬁrst round
see Loetzer & Mo¨nikes 2009: 87.
6. The following analysis is based on the experience of the authors as international
election observers during Ghana’s 2008 election with the EU and the Carter Center respectively,
complemented by additional ﬁeld research and/or professional experience in Ghana during the past
decade. Most of the quantitative data is based on ﬁgures provided by the Electoral Commission in
Accra.
7. We are grateful to an anonymous reader for drawing our attention to this, and for the obser-
vation that one probable reason was the impossibility of reconciling the declared results and the
aggregated polling station ﬁgures. In the Volta Region, Paul Nugent and Tom Molony came across a
number of examples where the reported polling station turnouts were over 100%. This also happened
on a signiﬁcant scale in Ashanti. It is clearly diﬃcult for the EC to draw attention to such anomalies,
but this has implications for the credibility of the process.
8. See the EC-website : www.ec.gov.gh/node/63, accessed 14.9.2009, for detailed 2004 presidential
results for regions and constituencies.
9. The negative example of the Kenyan 2007 elections (Harneit-Sievers & Peters 2008) may explain
the strong engagement of Ghanaian civic organisations that wanted to prevent similar atrocities in
their country.
10. The Carter Center had only previously observed the 1992 elections. Its return in 2008 reﬂected
concerns about how things were going in the registration phase.
11. The international donor community was in dire need of a democratic model to be presented to
African peers with rather doubtful governance credentials. The World Bank had, for example, already
facilitated a training mission in 2004 for the newly elected Liberian Parliament (before its inauguration)
in Accra, in order to learn from the Ghanaian Parliament.
12. Similar to the ‘diplomatic bias ’, the ‘ technocratic bias ’ is a potential characteristic of inter-
national election observation which distorts the result for technical rather than diplomatic reasons.
Increasing professionalism of election observation leads to a top-down approach on the part of the
observers, focusing on technical domains like the formal institutional framework of a democratic
multiparty system or sound sampling procedures. Last, but not least, due to lack of time and resources
for in-depth investigation, observers tend to disregard informal institutions and the indigenous socio-
cultural setting, which are of the outmost importance in Ghana in particular and in West Africa in
general (Meagher 2007). This concerns for example ‘money politics ’, which reaches far beyond ‘vote
buying’ or corruption in the political history of Ghana (Nugent 2001b: 407–10; Owusu 2006). Another
example is the question of land tenure and its instrumentalisation in politics, which will remain a big
and controversial problem in future. Recently discovered oil ﬁelds in the Ghanaian oﬀshore region
and the expectation of a big proﬁt added to the ﬁnancial prospects of the informal politics of elections.
Considering the latter might result in quite a diﬀerent interpretation of the electoral process (for a
more detailed exploration of the concepts see Kohnert 2004).
13. See below for detailed turnout ﬁgures of the 2008 election. However, there is no direct corre-
lation between the results of the speciﬁc conspicuous constituencies in the Ashanti and Volta Regions
in the 2008 elections, compared with the presidential polls in 1996, 2004 and 2000.
14. See Smith 2002: 629–33 for a detailed discussion of diﬀerences in voter turnout in Ashanti and
Volta in the 2000 elections.
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15. The turnout in the 2008 parliamentary election for the relevant constituencies in the Ashanti
and Volta Regions diﬀered only marginally (less than 1%) from that for the ﬁrst round of the presi-
dential election; see EC-website : www.ec.gov.gh/node/208, accessed 14.9.2009, and Tables 1 and 2.
Party support and support for the presidential candidate of that party likewise diﬀered only marginally.
This is no surprise, because voting was at the same time and place for both elections (parliamentary
and presidential ﬁrst round). Data on the parliamentary election are thus of limited, if any, value as an
additional cross-check on the presidential data for the second round.
16. See ‘Voters register hits 12.8 million’, available at : www.ghana.gov.gh/node/5615/print,
accessed 5.4.2009.
17. It is unlikely that even the newly employed tactic of the NPP (and NDC) in its stronghold,
vigorous house-to-house campaigns dubbed fre wo nua (literally, call your brother to go and vote), could
result in such a massive increase in the total number of additional voters in the two weeks between the
ﬁrst and second rounds. Although the quoted turnout ﬁgures are highly incredible, they are hard to
falsify with robust facts and ﬁgures under the present conditions in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa.
18. See the EC 2004 presidential election data-sheets at : www.ec.gov.gh/node/63, accessed
29.4.2009.
19. This comment is based on personal observation. Paul Nugent spent some time in the Electoral
Commissioner’s oﬃce on election day, and it was striking that a late release of results from Ashanti was
being anticipated as a contentious issue.
20. Empirical analysis for this section is based on numerous narrative and focus group interviews, as
well as talks with key persons, selected by means of both the snowball and pre-informed structured
sampling method conducted by Heinz Jockers all over the Province. It included election and party
oﬃcials, civil servants, the Ulama and Christian representatives, traditional authorities like the chiefs,
queen mothers and traditional healers, academics, and many other people during three months in the
pre- and post-election period of December 2008.
21. Daniel Smith (2002: 627–33) described this in detail for the 2000 election. It is all the more
surprising that during the 2008 election the EU observers hardly met any local observers at the polling
stations or at the tabulation centres of the region.
22. The constituency is situated in a minority area in the northern part of the region where, although
Akan is used as lingua franca, the diﬀerent groups are not related to the Akan. The Busia-Danquah
tradition gained one seat in this part of the region in 1969, but otherwise failed to make any inroads.
23. This allegation is based on a strategy paper by NPP giving hints how to manipulate elections.
Only some of these appear to have been acted on.
24. A court case was ﬁxed after the election.
25. By law, an agent who refuses to sign has to give the reason in a written form. This did not
happen at any polling station.
26. Paul Nugent and Tom Molony investigated NPP complaints of violence and intimidation in
some Volta Region constituencies on behalf of the Carter Center, but no clear picture emerged. In one
case, where serious allegations were made by the District Chief Executive, they encountered party
executives from the NDC and NPP who were on extremely friendly terms. However, there were some
polling stations which returned turnouts of over 100%. The NEC regional oﬃcer was co-operative,
but could not explain the anomalies.
27. Ketu South 11,167 more votes cast, Anlo 4,792, Avenor 5,073, Tongu North 4,786, Ho Central
4,495, and Ho East 4,954 are outstanding examples.
28. See Nugent 2001a.
29. There has always been suspicion about the link between the Ewe on each side of the Ghana–
Togo border, including allegations of arms traﬃcking.
30. All chiefs, queen mothers, herbalists and church authorities spoken to were convinced about a
clear win for NDC in the Volta Region. Though they oﬃcially have a neutral position, in reality they
play an active role, using informal structures usually closed to outsiders.
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